Unlike studies that estímate managerial bias, we utilize a direct measure of managerial bias in the U.S. insurance industry to investigate the effects of executive compensation and corporate governance on firms' eamings management behaviors. We find managers receiving larger bonuses and stock awards tend to make reserving decisions that serve to decrease firm earnings. Moreover, we examine the monitoring effect of corporate board structures in mitigating managers' reserve manipulation practices. We find managers are more likely to manipula te reserves in the presence of particular board structures. Similar results are not found when we employ traditional estimated measures of managerial bias.
INTRODUCTION
Earnings management has long been a tapie of interest to academic researchers, stakeholders, industry practitioners, and regulators. Despite the ample evidence of earnings manipulation and the importance of corporate governance in curtailing such manipulation, little research has examined the collective impact of executive compensation and board structure on earnings management. In this study, we extend previous literature by investigating the combined effect of executive compensation and board structure on firms' earnings management behavior. We jointly consider that (1) managers use discretionary accounting components to affect earnings for compensation enhancement and (2) firms structure boards to exert more control over managers, thereby potentially mitigating sorne of these effects.
Consistent with the prior literature utilizing estimated abnormal accruals, our results show a direct link between the incentive component of executive compensation and earnings management. Specifically, we observe that managers who derive larger proportions of their compensation from bonus payments and restricted stock are more likely to engage in earnings management. We further see that corporate governance through board monitoring plays an important role in curbing managers' manipulation of earnings, with different corporate governance structures being associated with varying degrees of manipulation by managers. We find these results using observed outcomes of managerial decision making (i.e., insurer loss reserve errors) instead of estimated measures of earnings management typically used in the accounting and finance literature. Moreover, our results are not found when we employ estimated measures of managerial bias. Our research contributes to the literature in several other important ways. First, this study augments the earnings management literature in general. It is well known that insurance companies are subject to much heavier regulation than almost all other industries. Hence, our study serves as a stronger test for earnings management than prior studies examining other industrial firms not subject to the same level of regulatory scrutiny as insurance companies.
Second, this research expands the current limited understanding of corporate governance in the insurance industry specifically. Despite the abundant evidence of loss reserve manipulation among property-liability insurers (Petroni, 1992; Beaver, McNichols, and Nelson, 2003;  Paterson, 2000, 2004) and the link between executive compensation and earnings management (Healy, 1985; Holthausen, Larcker, and Sloan, 1995;  Eckles and Halek, 2010) , no prior research in the insurance literature has investigated how insurers' loss reserve practices are affected by the joint impact of executive compensation incentives and board structure. Further, this is the first article that uses reserve errors to observe the initial impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) on corporate governance in the insurance industry.
Third, our article significantly adds to the narrow, yet growing literature regarding the interaction among executive compensation, board structure, and earnings management. Cornett, Marcus, and Tehranian (2008) and Cornett, McNutt, and Tehranian (2009) are the only two studies we know of that examine the jo;nt effect of corporate governance and executive compensation on earnings management. Yet, both Cornett, Marcus, and Tehranian (2008) and Cornett, McNutt, and Tehranian (2009) proxy earnings management by abnormal accruals, which are estimated indirectly using a regression model. Inferences drawn from their empirical evidence are thus limited, "dueto the difficulty of measuring the level of accruals absent managerial bias, since accruals are the expected future cash receipts and payments resulting from all current and past transactions, and researchers cannot directly measure managerial expectations" (Petroni, 1992, pp. 485-486) . We significantly advance Cornett, Marcus, and Tehranian (2008) and Cornett, McNutt, and Tehranian (2009) by utilizing a more accurate proxy of managerial bias, insurer loss reserve errors, which are disclosed in accounting results filed with state regulatory authorities and available through the National Association of Insurance Commissioners' Database (the NAIC Database). Specifically, statutory reporting requires insurers to estímate losses and to ultimately report the observed, realized values of the estimated losses. Hence, managerial manipulation is directly captured by the differences between the estimated losses and the actual realized losses reported by management, both of which are disclosed in annually filed regulatory reports. 1 Moreover, neither Cornett, Marcus, and Tehranian (2008) nor Cornett, McNutt, and Tehranian (2009) include insurance holding companies. Cornett, Marcus, and Tehranian (2008) study a sample of industrial firms in the Standard & Poor's (S&P) index from 1994. to 2003, whereas Cornett, McNutt, and Tehranian (2009) focus on the 100 largest bank holding companies in the United Sta tes from 1994 to 2002. According to Gillan, Hartzell, and Starks (2003) , industry factors account for most of the explainable variation in overall governance structure and appear to dominate time effects and firm factors. Therefore, the results from Cornett, Marcus, and Tehranian (2008) and Cornett, McNutt, and Tehranian (2009) may not apply to the insurance industry. We contribute to understanding the relation between executive compensation, board structure, and earnings management by pioneering an investigation of the U.S. property-liability insurance industry.
Finally, by focusing solely on the U.S. property-liability insurance industry, we better control for the differential effects of regulation and political pressure, which allows us to assess more directly the influence of executive compensation and board structure on earnings management. The corporate governance literature is known for being fraught with difficult to overcome endogeneity problems. The likelihood that our results are dueto the spurious correlation caused by unobserved heterogeneity is significantly reduced because our sample firms come from a single industry, and are thus more homogeneous (Blackwell, Brickley, and Weisbach, 1994; He and Sommer, 2010) . Compared to Cornett, Marcus, and Tehranian (2008) , our article is less prone to endogeneity, particular! y the problem of omitted variables.
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. The "Literature Review" section examines the extant literature. The "Hypotheses Development and Model Framework" section develops the research hypotheses and the economic models. The "Data and Descriptive Statistics" section provides details on the sample data and analysis methodology. The "Regression Results" section presents the empirical results, and the final section concludes.
LITERATURE REVIEW
Prior research has documented the manipulation of insurance accounting results for various reasons, including avoiding regulatory scrutiny (Grace, 1990; Petroni, 1992) , smoothing tax liabilities (Grace, 1990; Petroni, 1992; Petroni and Shackelford, 1999) , and increasing the compensation of executives (Healy, 1985; Holthausen, Larcker, and Sloan, 1995; Eckles and Halek, 2010) . 2 There also exists a literature investigating the oversight capacity that corporate governance mechanisms have in mitigating executives' manipulation of earnings (see Klein, 2002; Xie, Davidson, and DaDalt, 2003; Peasnell, Pope, and Young, 2005) . Despite evidence of earnings manipulation and the impact of corporate governance in curtailing such manipulation, little research has jointly examined the influence of executive compensation and board structure on earnings management. To our knowledge, Cornett, Marcus, and Tehranian (2008) and Cornett, McNutt, and Tehranian (2009) are the only papers to investigate earnings manipulation with respect to both corporate governance oversight and managerial compensation incentives.
Our article examines the joint hypothesis that managers use discretionary accounting components to affect firm performance and that a firm's board structure can potentially mitigate sorne earnings management incentives. We provide a brief review of these two research areas.
The first strand of research focuses on managers' motives to manipulate earnings. Sorne incentives are operational decisions that benefit the business entity, whereas others directly benefit managers at the expense of business owners. Dechow and Skinner (2000) categorize capital market based incentives for earnings management into two streams: (1) incentives provided by stock market participants (e.g., analysts and money managers) for managers to meet relatively simple earnings benchmarks (see Burgstahler, 1997; Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997; Degeorge, Patel, and Zeckhauser, 1999; Myers, Myers, and Skinner, 2007) and (2) incentives for managers to improve the terms of equity offerings by engaging in earnings management at the time of seasoned equity offers (see Rangan, 1998; Teoh, Welch, and Wong, 1998a) . While these incentives are more likely operational decisions, managers' incentives to manipulate earnings can also be self-serving. In particular, the growth of stock-based compensation has significantly affected managerial motives for earnings management, as "managers have become increasingly sensitive to the level of their firms' stock price and their relation to key accounting numbers such as earnings" (Dechow and Skinner, 2000, p. 237) .
Despite widespread belief among practitioners and regulators that earnings management is pervasive and problematic, academic research has not convincingly proved this to be the case, as indicated by Dechow and Skinner (2000) . McNichols (2000) suggests that "much of the controversy over interpretation of the literature's findings is dueto the extensive use of aggregate accruals models to characterize discretionary behavior" (p. 314). She further indicates that "future contributions to the earnings 2 A strand of literature explores similar issues within the banking industry. Previous research examilles how banks use loan loss provisions and gains and losses from securities to manage bank earnings and capital levels, finding mixed results. Por example, Beatty, Chamberlain, and Magliolo (1995) find no relation between eamings and loan loss provisions. By contrast, Collins, Shackelford, and Wahlen (1995) find a positive relation between eamings and loan loss provisions. Collins, Shackelford, and Wahlen (1995) , Beaver and Engel (1996) , and Ahmed, Takeda, and Thomas (1999) documenta negative relation between discretionary accruals and capital, whereas Beatty, Chamberlain, and Magliolo (1995) show a positive relation between these two items. management literature will come from papers that model the behavior of specific accruals with and without manipulation" (p. 338).
Studies in both the accounting and insurance literatures have considered the effects of managerial compensation packages on earnings manipulation. In the accounting literature, Healy (1985) , Gaver, Gaver, and Austin (1995) , and Holthausen, Larcker, and Sloan (1995) link the bonus component of executive compensation with earnings management through accruals. 3 In the insurance literature, Eckles and Halek (2010) find evidence that incentive-based components of executive compensation are positively associated with earnings manipulations. Similarly, Browne, Ma, and Wang (2009) show significant correlation between insurer reserve errors and the options granted to executives. However, neither study considers the role of board structure in mitigating the impact of the executive compensation packages on earnings management.
Studies in the corporate governance literature show that board structure affects the probability and/ or magnitude of earnings management. For example, Xie, Davidson, and DaDalt (2003) and Peasnell, Pope, and Young (2005) show that the management of earnings through abnormal accruals is somewhat mitigated by more independent boards. But none of these studies consider the impact of executive compensation on earnings management, and more importantly whether such an impact is mitigated by the firms' board structure. Cornett, Marcus, and Tehranian (2008) and Cornett, McNutt, and Tehranian (2009) are the only papers we know of that consider both managerial compensation and board structure within the context of accounting manipulation. Our article builds upon Cornett, Marcus, and Tehranian (2008) and Cornett, McNutt, and Tehranian (2009) in two important ways. First, our direct measure of managerial bias allows for a more accurate proxy for managerial discretion than estimated aggregate accruals models.4 Second, we consider multiple detailed, incentive-based executive compensation components rather than one proxy for compensation structure. 5 HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT AND MODEL fRAMEWORK Healy (1985) , Austin (1995), and Holthausen, Larcker, and Sloan (1995) all indicate sorne level of manipulation of reported earnings by managers through the use of discretionary accounting practices. Loss reserve estimation by insurance executives is one such discretionary practice. Ceteris paribus, we postulate that insurance executives who derive a larger portian of their total compensation 3 For an early summary of theories surrounding CEO compensation incentives, see Murphy (1999) . 4 Cornett, McNutt, and Tehranian (2009) themselves recognize the shortcomings of using regression residuals as a proxy for managerial discretion. In Footnote 11 on page 419, they indicate that it "should be noted that the model residuals contain all misspecifications and all models are at best approximations." 5 Cornett, Marcus, and Tehranian (2008) and Cornett, McNutt, and Tehranian (2009) In this section, we examine how various executive compensation components and several corporate governance characteristics relate to executives' discretionary accounting practices in insurance firms. The compensation components examined include bonuses, restricted stock held, stock options exercised, and stock options awarded. Prior research indica tes that each component does not necessarily induce the manager to act in a consistent manner. We therefore investiga te each compensation element and discuss whether it should induce earnings-decreasing behavior (e.g., restricted stock awards), earnings-increasing behavior (e.g., exercising options), and either earningsdecreasing or earnings-increasing behavior (e.g., structured bonus plans).
Executive Compensation and Reserve Errors
Several observable compensation items can be characterized as long-term incentive schemes. Awarding stock options and restricted stock is intended to align the longterm incentives of the executive and company. The "value" of these securities is not obtained during the year in which they are awarded but rather are ultimately realized in the future, contingent on the overall value of the firm. Stock options are commonly granted with an exercise price set equal to the price of the stock on the award date (Aboody and Kasznik, 2000) . Additionally, restricted stock grants are made at the current stock price. Therefore, as Aboody and Kasznik (2000) argue, executives prefer lower current stock prices to reduce the strike price of the option and to potentially increase the number of shares awarded? Hence, these compensation variables should provide motivation for managers to make earnings-decreasing decisions (i.e., relatively over-reserve for losses) in the current year. Over-reserving crea tes the temporary perception that the insurer has incurred larger losses, therefore reducing current stock prices. 8 This leads to our first testable hypothesis:
6 Klein (2006) finds that earnings management is positively related to CEO's sitting on the board' s compensation committee and negatively related to the CEO' s equity holdings and the independence of the board's audit committee, consistent with the notion that more independent boards may be more effective in monitoring the corporate financia! accounting process. Cornett, Marcus, and Tehranian (2008) show that compensation via stock options encourages earnings management whereas board independence and institutional monitoring discourage such earnings manipulations. 7 This is similar to the "spring-loading" effect noted by Yermack (1997) . 8 We are agnostic as to whether or not earnings manipulation does actually affect stock and stock option prices, and we do not purport to test these issues. There is significant debate as to whether or not managers can actually "fool" the market through earnings manipulation. On one hand, there is strong empirical evidence that the market does not see through data manipulation by management. For example, Wong (1998a, 1998b) and Rangan (1998) show that management manipulates accruals prior to initial public offering and seasoned equity offerings, leading to overvaluation of new issues. Also, Balsam, Chen, and Sankaraguruswamy (2003) In addition to long-term compensation components, we observe incentive-based compensation elements that are realized or exercised during the current year, such as bonuses and exercised stock options. The earnings management incentives created by these compensation components are not as straightforward as sorne other components. Specifically, Healy (1985) , Gaver, Gaver, and Austin (1995) , and Holthausen, Larcker, and Sloan (1995) indicate managers may have incentives to make both earnings-increasing and earnings-decreasing decisions based on the structure of a bonus plan. The payoff schemes of the bonuses investigated by Healy (1985) , Gaver, Gaver, and Austin (1995) , and Holthausen, Larcker, and Sloan (1995) resemble a generic "call spread," with upper and lower thresholds setting bounds on the potential bonus. 9 The manager's incentives then were determined by where the firm's earnings were relative to the thresholds. 10 We examine bonus plans similar to the plans studied by Holthausen, Larcker, and Sloan (1995) and Healy (1985) . 11 Unfortunately, our data do not provide sufficient detail regarding the structure of the executive bonus plans in order for us to make absolute predictions on the effects these plans may ha ve on loss reserving practices. 12 As is more transparent to the market, investors seem to penetrate such data manipulation by insiders and no abnormal stock retums are detected as in the case of employee stock option reissuance (see Coles, Hertzel, and Kalpathy, 2006 ). 9 That is, the payoff of the bonus is flat (presumably zero) until the first strike price (bonus threshold) is reached. The payoff then increases (though not necessarily in a linear fashion) until the second strike price (the upper bound of the bonus) is reached, at which point the payoff of the bonus again flattens. 10 A manager was shown to have an incentive to implement earnings-decreasing practices if the earnings were above an established upper bound (Healy, 1985; Gaver, Gaver, and Austin, 1995; Holthausen, Larcker, and Sloan, 1995) or if the earnings were well below the threshold where the manager would receive sorne performance-based compensation (Healy, 1985) . Alternatively, managers were shown to implement earnings-increasing policies if the firm's earnings were in the range where increased earnings would lead to increased compensation (Healy, 1985; Gaver, Gaver, and Austin, 1995; Holthausen, Larcker, and Sloan, 1995) . 11 The executives in our sample are also given bonuses termed "long-term incentive plans," which are essentially bonuses paid in 1 year based upon performance in multiple prior years. We remove these bonuses from consideration, since prior research has found them to be insignificant with respect to reserving practices (Eckles and Halek, 2010 ) and since they make up a very small proportion of the executive compensation packages for our executives (around 4 percent of total compensation). 12 Although we do not have specifics on the thresholds and upper bounds of all of the compensation packages, we do observe the plan details for a subset of the firms in the data. The bonus schemes reported in the 10-Ks of these firms are exactly the same as the schemes studied in Healy (1985) , Gaver, Gaver, and Austin (1995) , and Holthausen, Larcker, and Sloan (1995) . In these bonus schemes, there exists a lower and upper bound of earnings between which managers are rewarded a bonus, and outside of which the bonus is either not paid or capped. Although we are unable to obtain the specifics of every insurer's bonus scheme, for every year, we are confident that this common bonus scheme is generally employed by our sample of insurers.
described above, managers may have incentives to make either earnings-decreasing or earnings-increasing decisions with respect to loss reserves, depending on where the firm's performance falls relative to the structure of the bonus plan. Por example, as discussed above, managers would have an incentive to make earnings-increasing decisions if operating between the bonus threshold and upper limit of the bonus, should such a lirnit exist. We therefore test the following hypothesis:
H2: Firms whose managers derive a larger portian of total compensation from bonus plans in period t have more incentive to manipulate earnings in period t.
Options exercised by executives are by definition "in the money" and are therefore in the range where Healy (1985) , Gaver, Gaver, and Austin (1995) , and Holthausen, Larcker, and Sloan (1995) suggest earnings-increasing discretionary behavior occurs. Moreover, these generic options are presumably straight call options with no upper bound, which provide only incentives for eamings-increasing discretionary behavior. Thus, we expect managers of insurers to make earnings-increasing reserve errors, that is, under-reserve, when exercising call options. This leads to the first part of our anticipation hypothesis and our third testable hypothesis, H3, formally stated as:
H3: Firms whose managers derive a larger portian of total compensation from the exercising of options in period t have more incentive to make earnings-increasing reserving decisions in period t.
The value of restricted stock held presents additional incentives for executives. This component represents restricted stock currently owned by executives that may be sold or held at their discretion, so long as the restricted stock conditions have been satisfied. The incentives of executives to manipulate eamings will be determined by their holding period preferences. Executives who prefer to continue holding the restricted stock will be more inclined to undertake eamings-decreasing decisions in the current period so as to shift positive results to future periods when the restricted stock will be sold. Conversely, executives who prefer to liquidate in the short run are expected to make earnings-increasing decisions in the current period in order to maximize the current value of the firm, and thus the value of their restricted stock. 13 Our hypothesis related to restricted stock is formally stated as:
H4: Firms whose managers derive a larger portian of total compensation from restricted stock liquidation have more incentive to manipulate earnings.

Board Structure and Reserve Errors
To examine how board characteristics affect insurers' reserve practices, we focus on three key aspects of corporate boards: the size of the board, the fraction of independent directors, and whether the CEO is also the chairman of the board (i.e., CEO duality).
13 While the restricted stock held may be viewed as more of a wealth variable as opposed to a direct compensation variable, these holdings still provide an incentive for managers to manipula te reserves. The same is true for options that are awarded and may eventually be exercised. Lipton and Lorsch (1992) argue that the larger the board, the more difficult for all members to express their views in the limited time available at board meetings. Hence, smaller boards are more effective in monitoring. For our study, we hypothesize that smaller boards are better suited for monitoring insurer executives, because the insurance firms in our sample engage in complicated underwriting business. Hence, the smaller the board size, the greater its ability to monitor, and the smaller the subsequent absolute reserve errors. However, this association may be either negative or positive. That is, for executives who over-(under-) reserve to maximize personal benefits, we expect smaller boards will constrain the over-( under-) reserving practice.
With respect to board independence, numerous empirical studies suggest that independent boards provide effective monitoring. For publicly traded firms, the increased monitoring by outside directors can somewhat offset the entrenchment effects resulting from the ownership and control separation. 14 In particular, He and Sommer (2010) document that among property-liability insurance companies, those with greater separation of ownership and control use more outside directors. Hence, we predict a significant relation between the fraction of outside directors on the board and magnitude of the reserve error.l 5 Again, the association could be either negative or positive.
The extant literature suggests that CEO duality results in higher agency costs. 16 Hence, we predict that when CEOs hold dual positions, they tend to increase reserve errors, however, the direction of the reserve depends on how they derive their compensation. When over-reserving increases executive payoffs, all else equal, we expect firms with CEO duality will over-reserve even more. On the other hand, when underreserving provides larger executive benefits, all else equal, we expect firms with CEO duality will further under-reserve. In summary, our board govemance hypothesis is stated as:
H5: Reserving behavior will be affected by board size, board independence, and whether the CEO also holds the position of chairman of the board.
14 Though we do not study mutual insurers, Mayers, Shivdasani, and Smith (1997) find that mutual insurers employ more outside directors than stock insurers since other external mechanisms, such as the threat of a takeover, are relatively ineffective in mitigating agency problems. 15 Though sorne researchers raise doubts about whether more independent boards are better (e.g., Linck, Netter, and Yang, 2008; Coles, Daniel, and Naveen, 2008) , other researchers show that board composition does matter in a variety of contexts. For example, Weisbach (1988) shows a stronger association between firm performance and the probability of CEO turnover for companies with outsider-dominated boards whereas Brickley, Coles, and Terry (1994) find that the average stock market reaction to announcements of poison pills is positive for firms with outsider-dominated boards (and vice versa) and conclude that outside directors serve the interests of shareholders better than inside directors. 16 In 80 percent of the U .S. companies, the CEO is also the chair of the board (Brickley, Coles, and Jarrell, 1997) . Empirical research on the effect of CEO duality on firm performance is mixed. For example, Baliga, Moyer, and Rao (1996) find the market is indifferent to changes in a firm's CEO duality status and little evidence of operating performance changes around duality status changes. They find sorne weak evidence that duality status affects long-term performance. In contrast, Bhagat and Bolton (2008) show that CEO-chair duality is negatively related to firm performance. 
where i represents the individual insurers, t represents the year (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) , and REi,t represents the reserve estimation error associated with reserves reported for firm i in year t. By definition, a positive (negative) REi,t represents under-reserving (overreserving) in year tP LNASSETS is the naturallog of firm assets, NETINCOME is the net income of the firm, LONGTAIL is the proportion of business written in long-tailed lines, BONUS is the percent of total executive compensation received in the form of a bonus, RSTKAW is the percent of total executive compensation received in restricted stock awarded, RSTKHELD is the ratio of the value of restricted stock held to total executive compensation, STKOPAW is the percent of total executive compensation received in options awarded, STKOPEX is the ratio of the value of exercised options to total executive compensation, BOARDSIZE is equal to the naturallog of the number of directors on the board, OUTBOARD is the proportion of the board that is made up of independent (nonexecutive) directors, CEO DUAL is a indicator variable that is set to one if the CEO also holds the position as the chairman of the board and zero otherwise, v¡ is the company specific error, and ei,t is the random error. 18 A negative (positive) coefficient of an independent variable in (1) indica tes that an increase in that variable is associated with over-reserving/ earnings-decreasing (underreserving/ earnings-increasing) behavior. For example, if a long-term incentive compensation variable is found to have a negative coefficient, it implies that the larger the proportional compensation in this long-term component, the greater the overreserving/earnings-decreasing behavior. 19 H1 predicts the coefficients of RSTKAW 17 The loss reserve estimation error in year t is the developed loss reserve in year t + n for losses incurred in year t and earlier less the originalloss reserve estima te in year t for losses incurred in year t and earlier. We utilize a 5-year development period (n = 5). This follows the loss reserve estimation error methodology utilized by Petroni (1992) and Gaver and Paterson (2004) . In order to control for variation in insurer size and to reflect the loss reserve estimation error as a percentage, this difference is scaled by two altemative factors: (1) total admitted assets and (2) the 5-year developed reserve. 18 We also use the G-index from Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) as an alterna ti ve measure of corporate govemance strength. The results from model1 are similar when substituting the G-index for the corporate govemance variables given in model l. However, since the G-index (G-index components) is (are) not constructed (reported) for every year in the IRRC data set, using the G-index severely limits the number of observations we are able to use (more than half of our observations are lost). Additionally, the G-index may ha ve other flaws such as double counting, employing an arbitrary functional form, and so on. As such, we are hesitant to draw any conclusions from models utilizing this index. 19 Note that it does not matter where the initial reserves are set. If the compensation component induces eamings-increasing (eamings-decreasing) behavior, the loss reserves will be set lower (higher) relative to where they would have otherwise been set.
and STKOPAW to be negative. Finding any significance on the coefficients of BONUS is consistent with managers impacting reserving practices in response to these compensation items (H2). H3 predicts the coefficient of STKOPEX to be positive. Any significance of the coefficient on RSTKHELD is indicative of a relation between the reserve errors and the restricted stock held H4. In testing the board structure hypothesis, we expect the coefficients on BOARDSIZE, OUTBOARD, and CEODUAL to be significantly different from zero, though HS does not predict the sign for any of these coefficients. 20 We include proxies for insurer size (LNASSETS) and business mix (LONGTAIL), as prior research has shown them to affect reserve estimation error (e.g., business mix is significant in Aiuppa and Trieschmann, 1987, and Petroni, 1992 ; size is also significant in Aiuppa and Trieschmann, 1987 , but not in Petroni, 1992 , or Weiss, 1985 . NETINCOME is used to proxy an insurer's tax liability since related literature suggests that an insurer may manipula te loss reserves in an effort to minimize tax liability; hence, we would expect to see insurers reserve more (i.e., make income-decreasing decisions) for firms with higher levels of net income. A negative coefficient on NET-INCOME would reflect such over-reserving. Finally, according to Grace and Leverty (forthcoming) , it is possible that these control variables used are not significantly related to reserve errors. Our article can therefore be considered as a further test of the recent results reported by Grace and Leverty.
The Joint Effects of Board Governance and Executive Compensation
Although we expect to find a relation between the reserve errors and the board governance variables, it is possible that the relation among reserve errors, executive compensation, and board structure is sufficiently complex that differing incentives muddle the observed relation. The extant literature on corporate governance generally finds that firms with more effective board monitoring have lower agency costs. Since the board of directors has direct influence on executive compensation mechanisms, we posit that the associations between various compensation components and insurers' reserve errors should vary for firms with certain board structures. In other words, a chosen dimension of board structure should mitigate the impact of incentive compensation on reserve manipulation. This leads to our final hypothesis, which tests how the interactions between board governance and executive compensation mechanisms jointly affect reserve errors, formally stated as: 
where variables from model (1) remain the same. The indicator variable BOARD-STRUCT measures the strength of the board and is interacted with the compensation variables. BOARDSTRUCT equals one for firms with a particular board structure and zero otherwise.
In constructing BOARDSTRUCT, we analyze three factors: (1) the relative size of the board, (2) the relative independence of the board, and (3) whether the CEO is also chairman of the board. We define a firm to ha ve a board that is "large," potentially affecting effective oversight, if the board is larger than the median board size of our sample. Further, we define a firm's board to be "less independent" if it has fewer than the median percent of outside board members. Finally, we define a board to be "not separated" if the CEO also holds the position of chairman of the board (i.e., if CEO DUAL equals one). If the firm meets at least two of these three criteria (large, less independent, or not separated) the firm is considered to have a board structure where BOARDSTRUCT is equal to one. We hypothesize that the sum of ({3 + r )j will be different from fJj for at least one of the j compensation component variables (j = 1, ... ,6). However, the sign on r j is undetermined. If executives reserve more, then r is hypothesized to be negative for firms with boards with these characteristics. If executives reserve less, then r is hypothesized to be positive for firms with boards with these characteristics.
DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE 5TATISTICS
Since Ke, Petroni, and Safieddine (1999) show that more widely held insurance firms are more likely to base their CEO compensation packages on objective accounting measures, we limit our study to publicly held insurance companies. 21 Data for our research come from the Form 10-K that publicly traded companies file with the U.S. 21 Another reason for limiting the sample to publicly traded insurance companies is that information on executive compensation is not publicly available for privately owned insurance companies. 22 We are limited to using data years 2004 and earlier beca use of the 5-year loss reserve development, which is required in calculating the reserve errors.
Our data include a period of time where significant changes to the regulatory and economic environment of insurers occurred. The reasons for these reductions are as follows. First, ExecuComp reports individual annual compensahan figures for executive officers whereas the NAIC reports firm specific as well as consolidated information for insurers that are often composed of multiple insurance companies. 25 Since executive officers work for an entire insurance group (i.e., the publicly traded entity) and the corporate governance variables reported by the IRRC are at the group levet we utilize consolidated data for each insurance group based on the aggregation of individual insurers within each group. 26 We also cannot make distinctions between which executive(s) were the driving force behind the reserving practices. However, we can rationally assume the executives of each insurance 23 Due to the 5-year loss developrnent requirernent, loss reserve errors for year 2005 rnay not be calculated until the 2010 NAIC annual staternents are available. As of this writing, these staternents are not yet available. 24 Cornpensation for 1 year for one executive is defined to be one executive-year cornpensation observation. Accounting inforrnation for 1 year for one insurer is defined to be one insureryear observation. 25 For exarnple, in 1992 the Allstate Insurance Group consisted of 11 individual insurance cornpanies. The NAIC reports financial inforrnation for each of these 11 cornpanies as well as consolidated inforrnation for the entire group. 26 Sorne insurer groups do not provide consolidated data for their group to the NAIC and in sorne cases insurer groups report rnultiple consolidations for the sarne group. Hence, we rnanually create consolidated data for each insurer group. Our resulting aggregated insurer group data are consistent with those insurers who do report consolidated financial inforrnation to the NAIC.
group as a team were influential in the reserving practices of their respective group as they ultimately agreed to report these reserve amounts. Therefore, we aggregate and average compensation data for the executives of each insurance group whose compensation data are available.
Second, our calculation of 5-year loss reserve estimation errors for insurers does not allow us to use data beyond the year 2004. 27 Our methodology is consistent with Petroni (1992) and Gaver and Paterson (2004) where loss reserve estimation error is defined as the 5-year developed reserve reported in year t + 5 less the original reserve which was reported 5 years prior (i.e., year t).
Finally, we limit our initial sample to publicly held property-casualty insurance companies that are domiciled in the United States. 28 Mutual insurers are excluded from our sample, which also contributes to the relatively low number of insurer groups, for two reasons. Mutual insurers do not have stock or stock options to offer their executives. Further, incentive compensation data from mutual insurers (as for other privately held stock insurers) is self-reported to the NAIC and therefore incomplete.
The exclusion of mutual insurers should not be of significant concern since their executive compensation packages are not completely comparable with those of stock insurers, and including mutuals with stocks could lead to biased results. 29 Moreover, Ke, Petroni, and Safieddine (1999) show that widely held insurance firms are more likely to base their executive compensation packages on objective accounting measures.
The aggregation of executives' compensation data, the utilization of consolidated publicly held stock insurer data and the data limitations created by our 5-year loss reserve error calculation methodology combine to yield a sample of 213 and 98 insurer-year observations for our two sample periods based on 54 publicly traded property-casualty insurers. 30 27 For example, the 1997 developed loss reserve data are needed to calcula te 1992loss reserve errors and the 2005 developed loss reserve data are needed to calculate 2000 loss reserve errors. Since 2009 is the last year for which we have access to, we are unable to calculate reserve errors beyond 2004. 28 Life and health insurers are excluded as managers of these insurers ha ve much less discretion in establishing reserves because a larger portion of their reserves are based upon well-established and well-publicized actuaria! tables (see Petroni, 1992) . Also, the reserve development for life insurers is not reported to the NAIC, making the observation of loss reserve errors more difficult. 29 Analysis of loss reserve estimation error and executive compensation structure may be done on both mutual and stock firms, but in separa te models, with separa te hypotheses.
Here, we attempt to analyze only the stock portion of the industry and leave the analysis of mutual insurers to future studies that contain more complete executive compensation data for mutual insurers as well as privately held stock insurers. 30 The resulting sample reflects a relatively large portion of the U .S. property-casualty industry and reflects an even larger relative portion of property-casualty stock insurers, which is the only organizational form of interest to us. For example, in 1999 stock insurers accounted for about 67 percent of the entire property-casualty industry's net premiums written. Net premiums written by our sample of insurers represent approximately 59 percent of all stock insurers, or 39 percent of the entire industry's net premiums written in 1999. These percentages are consistent throughout the years of our sample data.
Panel A of Table 1 displays descriptive statistics for our sample of 213 insurer-year observations for the 1992-2000 period. Following previous insurance literature, we scale the 5-year loss reserve error by both admitted assets (RE1) and by the 5-year developed loss reserve (RE2). 31~32 We use both scalars to be consistentwith the extant literature, to control for variation in insurer size, and to provide further evidence if the scaling factor is important in studies of reserving errors.
The average magnitudes of RE1 and RE 2 are 1.86 percent and -5.33 percent, respectively. The majority of the sample under-reserve losses as the median error measures are 0.27 percent and 1.44 percent for RE1 and RE2, respectively. 33 RE1 and RE2 have similar standard deviation measures relative to their respective means. For RE1, the largest 5-year over-reserving error is 13.07 percent whereas the largest 5-year underreserving error is 84.24 percent. When measuring the reserve error relative to the developed reserve, the largest over-reserving and under-reserving errors are 241 percent and 72.10 percent, respectively.
The average value of total admitted assets is just under $10 billion and the average value of net income is approximately $374 million. These numbers reflect the bias toward large insurers in our sample. The smallest insurer in the sample has assets valued at $10 million. The variable LONGTAIL proxies an insurer's product mix where a higher value reflects more concentration in longer-tailed lines of business.34,35 In our sample, this ratio has an average of 51 percent, with a median value 31 The prior literature has generally used one or both of these scalars and rarely found any differences in results between the two scalars. Petroni (1992) and Beaver, McNichols, and Nelson (2003) use RE 1 but report that their results are not sensitive to the choice of the scaling variable. Gaver and Paterson (2004) primarily use RE 2 . Grace and Leverty (forthcoming) primarily use RE 1 but do find their results to be sensitive to the scaling variable. 32 RE 1 is technically scaled by admitted assets, which are themselves scaled by 1,000. 33 The size and direction of the RE 1 loss reserve errors of our sample are consistent with those estimated by Petroni (1992) when she scaled by admitted assets. Her sample considered property-casualty insurers from 1979 to 1983 and found mean and median loss reserve estimation errors of 2.1 percent and -0.2 percent, respectively. Sirnilarly, our sample RE 2 loss reserve errors are consistent with those estimated by Gaver and Paterson (2004) when they scaled by developed reserves. They examined property-casualty insurers from 1988 to 1993 and found an average overstatement of reserves by 2.75 percent. However, in the latter years of their sample, over-reserving averaged 5.70 percent in 1992 and 6.04 percent in 1993. 34 LONGTAIL is computed as the ratio of the sum of an insurer's net premiums written in the following lines of business to its aggregate net premiums written: farm multiperil, homeowners' multiperil, commercial multiperil, medical malpractice, workers' compensation, products liability, automobile liability, and "other" liability. Our definition of long taillines is consistent with other research (see Berger et al., 2000; Grace and Leverty, forthcoming; Hoyt and McCullough, 2010) . We estímate our models using altemative long taillines specifications, including one that removes farmowners' multiperil, homeowners' multiperil, workers' compensation, and automobile liability, and we also use a measure similar to Petroni and Beasley (1996) . Our results are robust to these altemative definitions of long taillines. 35 Since our concentration variable is the net premium written in long taillines to the total net prerniums written, negative values (if an insurer was a net cedant of long taillines) or positive values (if an insurer was a net cedant of short taillines) could potentially occur. We do observe four such observations (one negative and three greater than one [one of which is probably simply a rounding error in the insurer's data reporting process]). We have not 37 Finally, on average, executives exercised options equal to approximately 42.5 percent of their TOTALCOMP (STKOPEX). Board size ranged from 5 to 23 members for our sample. The average board size of our sample firms was 11 members. Further, the average percentage of outside directors on each board was approximately two-thirds, while two-thirds of all the boards had the CEO hold the position of chairman of the board. Finally, approximately 59 percent of the firms are classified as having the combination of board components where BOARDSTRUCT equals one. Panel B of Table 1 
REGRESSION RESULTS
Sample Period Results for 1 992-2000
Por all regressions, we use firm-level fixed-effects models to account for unobservable cross-sectional differences that affect reserve error. Panel A of Table 2 shows the results for Equation (1). The models were estimated using both measures of reserve error discussed above. 38 These results support the findings in Eckles and Halek (2010) . As predicted, the coefficient on RSTKA W is significant and negative in both specifications, supporting H1. This result is consistent with the notion of executives making earningsdecreasing decisions when granted restricted stock. We also find support for H2 with the negative and significant coefficient on BONUS. This result is consistent for the two specifications of reserve error and suggests that bonus payments received by executives are affecting their reserving behavior. Although we do not observe the exact altered the data, however conducting the analysis with the concentration variable truncated at O and 1 does not change our results. 36 Annual total compensation is comprised of the following: salary, bonuses, total value of restricted stock awarded, total val u e of stock options awarded ( using Black-Scholes ), long-term incentive payouts, and other perquisites such as signing bonuses, 401(k) contributions, debt forgiveness, severance payments, insurance premiums, and payment for unused vacation. 37 The magnitude of awarded options relative to bonus compensation in our sample suggests that both options and bonuses are commonly used to motivate executive behavior, and should both be included when examining executive compensation incentives for publicly traded property-casualty insurers. 38 Since sorne of the compensation components are partially a function of the reserve errors, potential endogeneity in our models may exist. Both the Wu-Hausman F-test and the DurbinWu-Hausman chi-square test strongly reject any endogeneity concerns for all models. In an attempt to distinguish between the differing incentives of bonuses, we also estima te the model adding interaction terms of the bonus variable with three insurer performancerelated indicator variables ("good," "average," and "poor"). As expected, we find negative and significant (at the 1 percent level) coefficients when interacting the bonus variable with the "good" and "poor" indicator variables. The results on the "average" interaction were not as significant. This result is consistent with the incentives at the lower and upper bounds of the bonuses affecting managerial behavior. 40 RE 1 is the insurer reserve error as a percent of assets, whereas RE 2 is the insurer reserve error as a percent of developed reserves. Additionally, the compensation variables are all *, **, and *** indica te significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
•wmte's standard errors.
calculated as a percent of total compensation. Therefore, for the compensation variables, the coefficient estimates in our models represent the associated change in the reserve error (as a percent of assets and developed reserve) for a 1 percent change in the compensation component. For example, the economic significance is quite similar for the two variables, BONUS and RSTKAW. For a change of 1 percent (i.e., from 20 percent to 21 percent) in the proportion of compensation from bonuses or restricted stock awarded, the reserve error as a percent of assets decreases by approxirnately 0.25 percent. When considering RE 2 , a 1 percent change in BONUS or RSTKAW reduces the reserve error as a percent of developed reserve by approxirnately 0.63 percent.
in the model using RE1, providing sorne evidence that executives exercising options are making earnings-increasing reserving decisions, supporting H3. We also find sorne support for restricted stockholdings affecting managerial incentives (H4), as the coefficient on RSTKHELD is positive and significant in the model using REz.
The coefficients of all three measures of board structure, BOARDSIZE, OUTBOARD, and CEO DUAL, are not significant. Thus, we do not find direct evidence in support of certain board structures mitigating the incentives of managers to manipula te earnings (H5). 42 This result suggests that the individual components of the board structure do not ha ve a direct significant impact on reserve errors. 43 However, the board structure when interacted with compensation components could affect reserve errors. We next conduct empirical tests for these predictions described in Equation (2).
To test the interactions between the board structure and compensation variables, we again use a firm-level fixed-effects model to estímate Equation (2) specifications for the period 1992-2000. Panel A of Table 3 shows the results of the fixed-effects specification whereas Panel A of Table 4 reports the results of the joint coefficients tests between executive compensation coefficients and their respective level of board structure coefficients (BOARDSTRUCT interaction coefficients). Although we do not observe a direct correlation between corporate board variables and reserve errors in the previous model (i.e., Equation (1)), here we find sorne evidence that corporate board structure indirectly affects loss reserve practices through its impact on the compensation/loss reserve relation. As shown in Panel A of Table 3 , the coefficient 41 As a robustness check, we rank the firms in quartiles based on admitted assets and separa te them into two groups: (1) firms in the top quartile and (2) all other firms. Fixed-effects estimations using these two groups show sorne slight changes to the significance of the individual coefficients we report; however, joint tests on our most significant variables (BONUS and RSTKAW) show that the coefficients are not statistically different for all but one case. The only difference observed is in RSTKAW for the model specification with RE 1 . In this model, the coefficient on RSTKAW for the large firms was insignificant whereas the coefficient for the remaining sample was negative and significan t. We also observe that the size of the board is significant in both specifications for large firms. 42 We also estima te Equation (1) using only BOARDSTRUCT in place of the three separa te board structure variables. Here, the significance of the coefficients on the compensation variables do not change and the BOARDSTRUCT variable coefficient is also not significan t. 43 To verify that our board variable results were not being obscured by the board structure minimizing the reserve error, we conducted two separa te analyses. First, we split our sample into firrns that had negative and positive errors prior to testing our models. In these specifications, board variables are never significant for the 1992-2000 period. Por the 2001-2004 period, we find the coefficient of CEODUAL to be positive and significant when using RE 1 , but only for firms with negative errors. We find no significance in any models for the other board variables, including board size. Second, per a suggestion by a reviewer, we estimated our models with the absolute value of the reserve error as the dependent variable (with interaction terms for our independent variables denoting firms with negative or positive reserve errors). Again, the coefficients of the board variables were insignificant for the 1992-2000 period. Further, we find a result consistent with CEODUAL for the 2001-2004 period. In particular, only firms with negative errors show a significant coefficient on duality (this time the sign is negative, again suggesting these firms are minimizing their errors). Hence, we do not feel that our lack of significance on the board variables is due to differing reserving incentives of insurers who under-and over-reserve. on BONUS is significant (at the 10 percent level) and negative in the model using RE2, and the coefficient on BONUS interacted with BOARDSTRUCT is significant and negative in the model using RE1. Panel A of Table 4 indicates that the combined effect of BONUS on loss reserve error is negative and significant after controlling for board structure. A similar result is found for RSTKA W. In Panel A ofTable 3, the coefficient on RSTKA W is significant (at the 10 percent level) and negative in the model using RE2, and the coefficient on RSTKAW interacted with BOARDSTRUCT is significant and negative in the m o del using RE1. In Panel A of Table 4 , the combined effect of RSTKA W on loss reserve error is negative and significant after controlling for board structure. Overall, (2) is different from zero. ** and *** indica te significance at 5% and 1%, respectively.
Panel A of Table 4 suggests that the impact of bonus schemes and restricted stock awarded on reserve errors is significant and negative. Taken together, these results provide evidence that bonus and restricted stock awards affect managerial incentives (consistent with the results from Equation (1)) and sorne evidence that certain board structures create more opportunity for executives to manipulate reserves in an effort to maximize their compensation from bonus and restricted stock awarded.
Sample Period Results for 2001-2004
Because our sample data cover a period of relatively lax regulatory scrutiny (i.e., pre-SOX) anda period of increased regulatory scrutiny (i.e., post-SOX), we ha ve a natural experiment on the effect of increased regulation on managerial behavior. We temper the results discussed below with an important caveat: our data include only 4 years into a period of potential increased regulatory oversight, resulting in a necessarily small sample size. 44 We believe our results are merely a starting point in research on the effects of increased regulatory scrutiny on insurer reserving practices. Using our methodology, a full analysis cannot be sufficiently completed until enough time has passed.
Results based on the 2001-2004 period are reported in Panel B of Tables 2, 3 , and 4. The primary result from our post-2000 sample is that compensation components no longer have as strong a significant association with reserve errors. Panel B of Table 2 shows RSTKHELD (restricted stock held) to be significant across both models (at the 1 and 10 percent levels for the models using RE1 and RE2, respectively) and BONUS to be significant (at the 10 percent level) in one model. In the 1992-2000 period, both
RSTKHELD and BONUS were significant (at least the 5 percent level) for both models. Purther, although Panel B of Table 3 shows several significant compensation coefficients, Panel B of Table 4 shows no joint significance of the compensation coefficients.
With the aforementioned caveat in mind, the post-SOX results provide limited evidence that increased regulatory scrutiny has altered managerial behavior with respect to using reserving practices to maximize compensation.
Accrual Quality Measures
An innovation of this article is the use of insurer loss reserve errors as an accrual quality measure to test the relation between firm earnings, managerial compensation, and corporate governance. As discussed above, several papers in the accounting and finance literatures use estimated accrual quality to test similar relation. Por comparison, we estimated two alternative accrual quality measures commonly used in the accounting and finance literature (see Prancis et al., 2005) . The first measure genera tes accrual quality based on an augmented version of the modified-Jones approach used in Comett, Marcus, and Tehranian (2008) (Prancis et al., 2005 , point out several criticisms to the modified-Jones approach.). We refer to this as AQ1. The second approach uses a time series estimation of the standard deviation of the original accrual quality measure. We refer to this as AQ2. Table 5 , Panels A and B, displays the correlation matrix between these two accrual measures, AQ1 and AQ2, and our measures, RE1 and RE2, for both sample periods.
The common measures used in the finance and accounting literature appear to be dissimilar to those used in the insurance literature. Panel A of Table 5 Table  5 shows AQ1 is slightly negatively correlated with our RE1 measure whereas AQ2 is not significantly correlated with either of our measures. Purther, we reestimated all of our models for both sample periods using AQ1 and AQ2 as the dependent variable. We find that (1) our models are generally not significant (none are significant at the 1 percent level) and (2) show virtually no relation between executive compensation, corporate governance, and accrual quality. For insurers, then, the traditional finance and accounting accrual measures do not reveal any relation between executive compensation and accrual quality.
CONCLUSION
This article examines the relations between the compensation of insurance company executives, the board structure of insurance firms, and the reserving practices of insurance firms. Executives' incentives to manipulate accounting results to maximize personal benefits are well documented in the earnings management literature. Our article adds to this strand of literature in two significant ways. First, most of the earnings management studies must estima te the managed earnings component since it is generally unobservable in accounting statements. We utilize a more accurate proxy of managerial discretion by taking advantage of insurance company data that report the developed reserve and actual reserve, the difference of which captures the actual accounting discretion exercised by insurers' managers. We further note that using standard measures of managerial discretion employed in the finance and accounting literature does not reveal the results we observe. Hence, our approach may provide researchers an opportunity to better capture earnings management relative to standard accruals models. Second, our study merges two related literatures, managerial compensation and corporate governance, by investigating the separate impact of managerial compensation and board structure as well their joint effect on managers' loss reserving practices. Our results suggest that the design of executive compensation is associated with earnings management behavior and the presence of certain board structures exacerbates such association. Our results are consistent, though not exactly identical to, Cornett, Marcus, and Tehranian (2008) and Cornett, McNutt, and Tehranian (2009) . Like Cornett, Marcus, and Tehranian (2008) and Cornett, McNutt, and Tehranian (2009) , we find that certain managerial incentives are more likely to lead to earnings management. However, we do not observe the board structure to be as strong of a mitigating influence.
The misalignment of interests between executives and shareholders has long been a focus of corporate governance literature. Incentive-based compensation was developed in part to align the interest of managers with that of shareholders. However, these mechanisms are not costless, as incentive-based compensation also encourages managers to use discretion over accounting practices to maximize their own utility. Despite heavy regulation in the insurance industry, insurer managers have still been able to exercise sizable discretion over accounting numbers where these actions are encouraged by incentive-based compensation, coupled with insufficient monitoring from the board. Specifically, we find evidence of bonus plans, restricted stock awards, exercised stock options, and restricted stockholdings affecting earnings management. Though we do not find a direct effect of corporate governance strategies (e.g.,larger vs. smaller boards) on these managerial incentive-based mechanisms, we do find an indirect effect. Particularly, we note that certain board structures allow for further opportunistic reserve manipulation by managers.
Recent regulations, most notably SOX, have attempted to improve corporate governance by mandating increased accuracy and transparency in firms' financia! reporting, and holding executives accountable for any such shortcomings. By examining the pre-and post-SOX period in our data, we note that these regulatory strategies may be resulting in their desired effect. While we find relations between insurer reserving practices and managerial compensation packages befare the period of SOX, we find much smaller associations after the enactment of SOX, although this is a notably shorter period.
Finally, we do not claim to provide a complete test of the efficacy of the current regulatory environment. However, our results do offer sorne preliminary 1 early indication that recent regulatory changes brought to accounting practices, reporting requirements, and corporate boards do appear to have reduced the relation between incentive-based managerial compensation components and insurer loss reserve errors. Future research in this area may further explore the effectiveness of regulatory changes. Going forward, regulators of priva te firms ( e.g., nonpublicly traded insurers) may also utilize similar provisions in arder to minimize potential problems brought on by incentive-based compensation packages.
